The growing need for organ and tissue transplants has led a number of states to enforce a policy that views a donor's declared intent to be an organ donor as legally binding. This allows health offi cials to harvest organs without the permission of the next of kin. Legally binding consent is controversial because of concerns that it may anger family members, lead to negative publicity, and discourage potential donors. We use interviews and a pooled time-series data set of cadaveric donation rates in U.S. states to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy. Our research indicates that enforcement of legally binding consent has marginally increased cadaveric donations while not signifi cantly affecting donor registration. We also fi nd evidence that the effect of the policy might be greater if it were more fully implemented and coordinated with efforts to improve public acceptance and awareness.
Policy makers seeking to increase the rate of organ donation from individuals following their death face a daunting task. First, they must encourage people to become donors when the primary motivation for participation is altruism since they will not be around to see the benefi ts that accrue to the recipient. Second, people who declare themselves donors will not be able to ensure their wishes are carried out. A third party is required to secure the organs, working with a grieving family that may or may not have been aware of the donor's intent. The breakdown between the intent of the donor and those needed to implement their desire complicates an already diffi cult task. It also complicates policy efforts aimed at alleviating organ shortages.
To date, these efforts have been less than fully successful. On any given day, an average of sixty patients receive life-saving transplants, and another sixteen die from the lack of a suitable organ (United Network for Organ Sharing [UNOS] 2004) . The magnitude of the problem is heightened when we look at the disjuncture between the total number of transplant surgeries and the demand for organs. Advances in transplant technology have steadily increased the difference between the demand for organs and the number of transplants. In late 2002, requests for organs outnumbered transplants by over fi fty-fi ve thousand (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and the Scientifi c Registry of Transplant Recipients 2003). The gap has increased by forty-seven thousand since 1991, an increase of some 500 percent. As one journalist noted, "Altruism isn't working" (Kristof 2002: A27) . The need for organs has led policy makers, policy analysts, and desperate patients to search for an answer. The diversity of the proposals is striking. Some organ procurement organizations (OPOs) have begun to use organs from non-heart-beating donors whereas others have expanded the use of marginal or older cadaveric (brain-dead) donors (Robertson 1999; Evans 2003) . The most radical, and ethically challenging, proposals seek to remove the reliance on altruism. Among the proposals are those that seek to create an economic market for organs, one that would restrict donation to those who previously registered to be organ donors, and a $10,000 tax credit for the heirs of a donor. A more limited fi nancial incentive in the form of a donation to a family's funeral costs or a charity was tested in Pennsylvania (Mesich-Brant 2002) . The program was subsequently blocked by the federal government and the funds are now made available to offset the costs to living donors.
A second set of ideas seeks to reduce the reliance on cadaveric donors. Efforts to increase the number of living organ donors have begun to pay off; living donors exceeded cadaveric donors for the fi rst time in 2001. In 2004, Wisconsin became the fi rst state to provide living donors with up to a $10,000 tax deduction for certain expenses. Proponents argue that government tax deductions can increase organ availability and help prevent organ brokering (Griffi n 2004) . Finally, there has long been discussion of switching to a less voluntary system of presumed consent. Under presumed consent, any candidate for cadaveric donation would be considered to have consented unless they had explicitly registered a refusal.
Ethical and societal concerns complicate the enactment of many of these policies. Ethicists are troubled by the use of fi nancial incentives. Financial incentives, the concern goes, have the potential to redefi ne bodies and organs as mere commodities and thus to create incentives to pre-maturely end lives (Evans 2003) . As a result of these challenges, several less radical policies have emerged in recent years as more viable tools for increasing donation and transplantation rates. In the 107th Congress, several bills sought to make changes in federal organ donation policy; however, none were signed into law. The more limited bill, the Motor Donor Bill, included the creation of a national organ and tissue registry built through existing declarations of intent on state vehicle driver license applications, a national organ donor advisory committee, and funds for public education campaigns and state coordination. A competing measure, Darlene's Law (named for the sponsor's late wife who had been the recipient of a liver transplant), sought more signifi cant change. Darlene's Law called for the creation of a national registry through a new declaration of intent on federal tax forms. More important, the bill established that the declaration of intent to donate was legally binding and thus not subject to the consent or concurrence of the deceased's family. Transplant and organ procurement experts traditionally have sought consent from the deceased's next of kin before harvesting organs. Enforcement (or use) of legally binding consent, also known as fi rst-person consent, already exists in federal law, but remains controversial and rare because of concerns regarding deference to grieving families and the possibility of scaring off potential donors.
The growing shortage of organs and the increasing use of legally binding consent at the state level (a version of Darlene's Law was recently enacted in Minnesota, where she served as a state representative) has focused attention on the effectiveness of this policy change and indirectly on the development of donor registries. By the end of 2001, organ procurement organizations in twelve states were enforcing legally binding legislation (Mesich-Brant 2002) . In addition, nineteen states have implemented state donor registries. Although the majority of these states have only implemented these policies in recent years, suffi cient data now exist to evaluate the impact of the changes. That is the goal of this research. We use a pooled time-series data set of cadaveric donation rates in the states and a series of interviews with organ procurement and transplant offi cials to examine the impact of OPO decisions to actively implement fi rst-person consent and state development of donor registries. In offering this assessment, we contribute to the existing literature on the causes of organ donation rates and, through that, the design of public policies targeted at promoting socially responsible behavior.
We proceed as follows. We fi rst discuss the challenge of designing a policy instrument in the fi eld of organ donation and how the policy area has developed. We then present the logic behind the implementation of both legally binding consent and donor registries and the policy questions they raise. After estimating an empirical model of cadaveric donation rates, we interpret the results in conjunction with the fi ndings of our interviews. We conclude with a general assessment of organ donation policies.
The Challenge of Instrument Selection
Public policy is formed with the intent to modify the behavior of individuals or groups to bring about the goals of those in power. Policy goals, however, can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms. As a result, policy development focuses on the selection of an instrument, or group of instruments, capable of achieving the desired outcome with a minimum of drawbacks and that fi ts within the value scheme of those in power (Linder and Peters 1989; Howlett and Ramesh 1995) . The challenge lies in identifying the actors or target audiences involved in a policy and developing a causal theory as to how their interests and motivations drive their behavior. By understanding the causal process underlying the actions of the target audience, the policy maker can select an instrument that is best situated to altering the calculations of the actors such that they will behave in accordance with the goals of the policy Ingram 1990, 1997) . The policy studies literature has sought to simplify this process by developing policy typologies that classify policies based on their underlying goals and that imply the selection of appropriate instruments. The typologies often are based on the necessary level of government coercion or the desired policy outcome (Lowi 1972; Tatalovich and Daynes 1988) .
Although Lowi's (1972) regulatory, distributive, redistributive typology is often the point of departure for classifying policies, recent work has addressed how the government ought to deal with issues that involve social or moral confl ict and goals (Tatalovich and Daynes 1988; Meier 1994; Mooney 2001) . Social regulatory policy, or morality policy, has been defi ned as areas in which there is an absence of societal consensus and in which the government is seeking to modify community values, moral practices, or norms of behavior. Many of these disputes lend themselves to traditional coercive policy tools such as criminal penalties, regulations, or taxes. These policies, however, often involve the use of less coercive mechanisms such as public education programs that seek to alter behavior through persuasion or the provision of information. It is here that the challenge in developing policy tools for organ donation begins to arise.
Although organ and tissue donation policy contains elements of these traditional policy types and tools, it is not readily classifi ed into an existing typology. Although the government does prohibit some behaviors such as directly selling organs, the reliance on voluntary behavior and rules for recipient selection reduces the overall role of government actors. Because existing policy typologies are often based on the nature of government coercion, the relevance of classifi cations such as distributive or redistributive policies is limited. Neither does organ donation fi t into the newer class of morality policies. The debate surrounding the morality of the practice has given way to general acceptance, and the ethical debates have shifted to the potential use of fi nancial incentives or the conscription of cadaveric organs (Evans 2003; Spital 2003) .
Organ donation is unique in several ways. First, the government's role is primarily one of promoting socially virtuous behavior rather than regulating behavior (Mesich-Brant 2002) . Second, the tools available to induce behavior have been restricted due to ethical concerns. As noted earlier, fi nancial incentives raise concerns about turning body parts into commodities, the routing of organs to wealthy individuals, and bringing money into the decision over whether to remove prospective donors from life support. Finally, organ donation involves a unique form of agency that exacerbates the problem of implementation common to most policies.
The problem for the transplant community is that it is easier to get people to declare their intent to donate than it is to actually get their organs should the opportunity present itself. By defi nition, cadaveric donors are not capable of seeing their wishes carried out. Organ procurement policies have long sought to respect family autonomy by seeking permission from the next of kin to remove organs (Spital 2003) . The family thus serves in a fi duciary role, often acting on behalf of the donor no matter his or her original intent. The high rates of family refusal suggest that this relationship is breaking.
The experience of the health care community in Minnesota is illustrative of the larger national problem (deFiebre 2002; Marcotty 2002) . Surveys have found that 96 percent of respondents support organ donation. However, only 58 percent of those surveyed reported that they had designated themselves as donors on their driver's license. That fi gure overstates the actual rate at which individuals sign up. State fi gures indicate that between 30 and 40 percent of licensed drivers designate themselves as donors. Those numbers, while low, are not the central problem in low organ supply because they translate into just over 1 million registered donors in Minnesota. The more pressing problem is that when unfortunate circumstances put these individuals in the position to donate, between 40 and 50 percent of their families prohibit the donation from taking place (Siminoff et al. 1995) . That means that close to 500,000 registered donors, individuals who declared their intent to donate, could have that intent disregarded.
The slippage between policy design and implementation is not unique to organ procurement policies. What may be unique is the frequent breakdown in the agency relationship between the deceased and his or her family. One response to the breakdown has been to direct policies toward encouraging potential donors to discuss their intentions with their families. The intent here is to promote agency fi delity. A second response has been to seek mechanisms to remove the reliance on agents all together. Since the passage of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, offi cials from organ procurement organizations and hospitals have had the ability to consider a person's decision to designate himself or herself as a donor as a legally binding decision and thus recover the organs no matter the views of the donor's family. With few exceptions, which emerged only recently, they have chosen not to do this. Those involved in organ procurement have traditionally sought the permission of family members out of deference to their grief and a desire not to lose additional donors by adding to that grief either privately or publicly, if efforts to take organs without consent are publicized. The fact that many people's altruistic decisions to become donors are not being carried out has brought a new element to the debate surrounding organ donation policy-a debate that revolves around the means to ensure that the altruistic decisions are implemented.
Organ Donation Policies and the Emergence of Legally Binding Consent
Over the past three decades, national and state policy makers have attempted to address the shortage of organs by utilizing widespread public education programs and policies designed to increase the administrative effectiveness of existing organ procurement systems (Caplan and Coelho 1998) . The emphasis on voluntarism in organ donation policies put an early emphasis on public education programs designed to increase the number of individuals electing to designate themselves as donors. Surveys indicate that these efforts have been successful in increasing public awareness and support for donation. Despite strong support for donation, these policies have not signifi cantly increased organ procurement (Siminoff et al. 1995) . Laura Siminoff et al. (ibid.) argue that the disparity between public support and organ procurement led policy analysts and legislators to focus on the perceived failure of health care workers to request donations from families of eligible donors. Laws passed in 1984 and 1987 sought to encourage donation by requiring hospitals to make a routine inquiry of patients admitted to the hospital as to whether they would like to donate organs and by requiring Medicaid-and Medicare-participating hospitals to refer all deaths and imminent deaths to a local organ procurement organization so the potential donors could be identifi ed and their families asked about donation. Compliance with the regulations was linked to Medicare reimbursement, but as of 2002, no facilities had been sanctioned (McBride 2002) .
In addition, a number of states enacted required request legislation that mandated hospitals to ensure that families of potential donors were approached and given the opportunity to donate. State-level studies found that these efforts resulted in only modest increases in organ procurement and that the increases stopped after a few years (Caplan 1984; Caplan and Welvang 1989) . In a broader study, Siminoff et al. (1995) found that efforts to ensure contact with families were generally successful. They found that health care professionals properly identifi ed potential donors and approached their families in 87 percent of the hospital cases they reviewed. However, they also found that the families of younger patients and nonwhite patients were less likely to be approached. Siminoff et al.'s (ibid.) study also looked at the factors that infl uenced a family's willingness to consent to donation when asked. The results indicate that the failure to approach these families had an impact on overall procurement. The impact stems from the fact that families of younger patients were more likely to donate when asked and that there was no difference between the consent rates of white and nonwhite families. They also found that the type of health care provider who approached a family had an important impact on consent rates. The consent rate for medical social workers and clergy was 15 percent higher than that for clinicians. The results of this study mirror the development of subsequent donation policies, and new efforts were directed at improving contacts with families and increasing donation within minority communities.
Several countries have had success with improved training of doctors and transplant coordinators. Kuwait and other Gulf states saw an increase in cadaveric donations after developing a protocol that placed a special emphasis on having transplant coordinators work with neurologists on brain death cases (al-Mousawi et al. 1999) . Spain achieved a 142 percent increase in donations since 1989 by placing transplant coordinators in intensive care units across the country. The coordinators also monitored emergency departments and took the lead in discussing the donation process with families of eligible donors (Spooner 2003) . Similar efforts have proved successful in the United States. One program sought to change the way families are approached. A volunteer network of mothers of organ donors was established to help assist families facing the death of a loved one (Henderson 2000) . The families assisted by the volunteers consented to donation at twice the national rate. A demonstration project in South Carolina that increased the number of transplant coordinators and enhanced their counseling abilities resulted in a signifi cant increase in donation rates (Sade et al. 2002) .
Similar efforts have been directed at the African American community to improve donation rates. Transplant waiting times have increased for African Americans and a lack of organs from African Americans is believed to be a contributing factor (Siminoff and Sturm 2000) . Research has shown that support for donation is higher in the African American community than many thought, but it has also shown that family discussions and trust in the medical fi eld play important roles in gaining consent for donation (Morgan 2004; Siminoff and Sturm 2000) . The studies have also linked increased knowledge of organ shortages among African Americans to increased support for and a willingness to donate, and this has led to efforts and renewed calls to employ targeted educational campaigns.
More recent research has focused on alternatives to the voluntary system currently in place. Much of the work discusses the ethical implications of offering fi nancial incentives or outright conscription of organs (see Spital 2003; Veatch 2003) . Others have begun to explore public support for fi nancial incentives and the potential impact of specifi c incentive programs on decisions to consent to donation. In an innovative experimental study, John Evans (2003) found that respondents to a survey experiment were not supportive of or infl uenced by direct payments for organs. Consent decisions were infl uenced by payments that would offset medical bills when the families of the deceased were at risk fi nancially due to mounting medical bills. Evans concludes that fi nancial incentives may be viable when they are designed to alleviate costs or concerns related to the original medical causes of a family member's illness, but that direct payments do not seem to induce people and may even result in a backlash due to concerns that cash payments violate the sanctity of the body and familial relationships.
The ethical diffi culties surrounding fi nancial incentives and the lack of federal activity to promote organ donation has heightened the already prominent role of state governments in organ procurement. Organ procurement and distribution are coordinated by a coalition of OPOs spread throughout the United States who work closely with health care workers and state offi cials. States took the lead in funding public education campaigns, setting the legal age for donation, and using drivers' licenses as a means of designating oneself as a donor. Currently forty-eight states allow citizens to declare themselves as donors on licenses. The use of these lists varies widely. As of January 2004, only twenty-six states used this information to maintain a database of registered donors that could be accessed by health care workers, an increase of six states from 2002 (Mesich-Brant 2002; UNOS 2004) . Another six states are setting up a registry or have proposed legislation to start one. Properly maintained donor registries that allow for quick access by health care and law enforcement offi cials are seen as an important tool for ensuring that donor wishes are determined in time to allow for organs to be retrieved (Lewin Group 2001) . State donor registries have been perhaps the most frequent response to the gap in needed organs with some fi fteen states taking up the option in the past three years. Their effectiveness, however, remains in doubt, a point we address later.
States have also increasingly turned to fi rst-person or legally binding consent laws that allow them to retrieve organs without asking permission of the next of kin. Federal law allows for a prospective donor's declared intent to be legally binding and not subject to being overruled by family members; however, for many years organ procurement organizations did not enforce this out of respect for families and a desire to not discourage people from becoming donors (Mesich-Brant 2002) . As of 2004, thirtysix states had passed similar laws that allow for fi rst-person consent, but these laws do not force OPOs to carry out this policy and many of them defer to families (UNOS 2004).
As of 2002, organ procurement organizations in fi fteen states had taken the step of actually enforcing legally binding consent. The primary motivation for the switch was to secure more organs by restricting the next of kin's ability to deny access to the organs, something that most studies fi nd occurs close to half of the time. One OPO director stated that the move to enforcing legally binding consent was a result of hospital staff failing to check for donor cards, forgetting to ask family members for permission, or deliberately not asking families out of a concern for exacerbating their grief (Kornick 1999 ). An additional argument in favor of legally binding consent is that this may actually relieve the pressure placed on family members having to make such a decision during a time of grief (May, Aulisio, and DeVita 2000) . An argument could also be made that by merely passing such laws states may focus attention on the issue of organ donation and perhaps infl uence new or current prospective donors to discuss their intent with family members.
Acceptance of legally binding consent is not widespread because many in the organ procurement fi eld are troubled by the idea of bypassing family members. Practitioners have expressed concern that the switch to fi rstperson consent may alienate additional donors, be the subject of negative publicity if upset family members go public with complaints, and open up the possibility of lawsuits against hospitals or health care workers (Mesich-Brant 2002) . The main concern of some professionals is that fewer people may choose to declare their intent to donate if they believe their family will not be consulted.
The shift to enforcing a donor's wish to donate is a controversial policy within the medical profession and among scholars. The debate has focused on the ethical issues regarding family participation in decision making and the potential long-term effects of negative publicity on prospective donors. The debate has only recently begun to address the effectiveness of the policy change. Because so few states have moved to fi rst-person consent, and most have done so recently, data have been limited. A broader assessment is necessary to better inform the ongoing policy debate.
The Effectiveness of Enforcing Legally Binding Consent
The complexities of organ procurement policies that seek to enhance donation make any evaluation diffi cult. In the case of fi rst-person consent, the complexity may provide a strong case to expect meager results. Organ donation involves a chain of events and a multitude of actors. Traditionally, health care workers must identify a possible donor and then contact the local OPO to approach the deceased's family. Under legally binding consent, the OPO may initiate the organ recovery process without family consent, but at any number of points, an actor in the process can decide to ignore the donor's declared intent and ask the next of kin for permission. To best capture the effectiveness of the process, we conducted both qualitative interviews and statistical analyses. We discuss the methods and results sequentially.
Interviews
We conducted standardized open-ended interviews following a purposeful maximum variation sampling plan (Glaser and Strauss 1967) . Subjects were chosen who exhibited a wide range of characteristics. Maximum variation sampling documents unique and diverse variations that have emerged in adapting to different conditions while also identifying common patterns or themes that cut across variations. Our sampling design involved two stages. We fi rst selected states and then we selected actors within those states. The criteria used for state selection included (1) choosing states with OPOs that utilize different policy tools; (2) choosing states that have multiple OPOs that were divided on their decision to enforce legally binding consent; (3) choosing one state from each section of the country to ensure regional and demographic variation; and (4) convenience sampling in an effort to expand, supplement, and gain greater diversity in the sample. The ten states chosen were California, Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
We next selected the key actors in the policy process and the various stages of the organ and tissue procurement process. The actors contacted included state legislators who sit on health-related committees and who, if feasible, have taken an active role regarding organ donation; executive directors, chief executive offi cers (CEOs), or presidents of OPOs; hospital administrators from health care facilities that house transplantation programs; and transplant coordinators. The initial sample size was forty-eight. Because the initial response rate was not satisfactory, we also utilized snowball sampling to augment data collection. We gained an additional seven interviews through the use of snowball sampling for a total of twenty-six interviews and had a fi nal response rate of 54 percent. The sample consisted of thirteen males and thirteen females. Fourteen individuals were from states that are enforcing the legally binding policy change, whereas twelve were from states that are not. The majority of respondents were executive directors of OPOs or transplant coordinators and surgeons.
The interviews demonstrated that organ transplant professionals are widely aware of the use or availability of fi rst-person consent (only two of twenty-six were unaware), but that they are divided on its use and effectiveness. Moreover, evidence of slippage between the donor's intent and procurement of the organs surfaced, even in states where fi rst-person consent is being implemented.
Respondents were asked about concerns that use of legally binding consent might increase lawsuits and reduce donations by leading people to believe they or their family would lose control over the decision. Twelve respondents believed the criticism to be wrong. Four of these were from states using legally binding consent, and all responded that they faced little opposition to the policy and saw either no lawsuits or no increase in lawsuits. The concern over lawsuits drew the most skepticism in this group. Of the twelve, four respondents saw no legal issue at stake and thus did not expect an increase in lawsuits whereas another three believed fi rst-person consent (and declaring oneself a donor more generally) was equivalent to any other advance directive that should be followed if verifi ed. Seven respondents saw merit in the criticisms of the policy. The most common concern expressed by fi ve respondents was the likely fact that the process would cause next of kin additional grief and through this cause the loss of other potential donors in the family. Only one respondent expressed concern over lawsuits.
A similar division of opinion emerged when respondents were asked about the current or potential effectiveness of implementing legally binding consent. Nine respondents questioned the effectiveness of the programs and their staff's willingness to forego family permission. A respondent from Tennessee noted that even though the state had switched to legally binding consent, personnel were not using the tool out of deference to the family's grief. The majority of respondents who felt the new policies were effective conditioned the benefi ts on successful education campaigns that would ensure patient advocacy groups and the public that their freedom of choice was not being compromised. Only three respondents, two from areas enforcing the new policy, gave an unequivocal yes when asked about the effectiveness of enforcing legally binding consent; however, even one of those was unwilling to rule out attitude change or educational efforts. Interview respondents in Pennsylvania and Virginia reported substantial increases in organ and tissue donation (5 to 10 percent annually) since implementing fi rst-person consent, but were not willing to attribute the increase solely to the new procedure. As noted above, they also indicated that they did not experience drops in donation or lawsuits as a result of implementing the policy. Overall, the interviews produced limited evidence that legally binding consent has increased donations in select areas and that it has yet to have the negative ramifi cations thought to possibly result.
A number of fi ndings in the interviews illustrated the diffi culty in implementing the wishes of a donor that we discussed earlier. A number of respondents noted that OPO staff were still reluctant to bypass family members and that families could halt donations even if legally binding consent was in place. A respondent gave the example of a family refusing to provide medical information about a donor with the result that the donor was declared medically ineligible. We also asked respondents about any experiences in which next of kin resisted donation even when informed that the potential donor had declared his or her intent to donate. Fifteen respondents reported having been in such a situation, with the donations proceeding in eight cases. Interestingly, three of the seven instances in which the organs were not collected took place in locations where the state and the OPO were enforcing legally binding consent. Two respondents noted that in these instances it was still important to approach the task on a case-by-case basis that was centered on the family's level of resistance.
Our interviews found that legally binding consent was widely known, but often greeted with either outright skepticism or supported if it was only one part of a larger strategy to increase acceptance of donation and fi rst-person consent. The interview did reveal that, where implemented, respondents were supportive of the policy and believed it increased donations and did not result in lawsuits or decreases in registered donors. Finally, the interviews support the notion that organ donation policies exhibit a uniquely complicated form of agency and that use of legally binding consent may reduce, but not eliminate, this challenge. These fi ndings are obviously limited because of their focus on individual states. Overall, the interview results show a lack of commitment to the new policy and a potential problem for full implementation. The question now is whether we see an increase in actual donation or whether these diffi culties have blocked the ability of fi rst-person consent to help increase the number of donations.
Empirical Analysis
We begin with a brief look at three states that have used the policy for a comparatively long period. Figure 1 charts the cadaveric donation rates (donors per one thousand citizens) for three states, where the arrows indicate the years in which the OPOs began enforcing the new policy. No single story emerges from these states. Pennsylvania enforced the new policy within an existing upward trend in donations, but saw impressive gains when they made the shift after several years during which donation growth had stagnated. In Tennessee, the donation rate stagnated for three years following the policy change before showing gains in 2001 and 700 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 2002. The use of fi rst-person consent appears to have had little effect in New Jersey. An initial increase in donations quickly gave way to several years of declines. These results may refl ect the fi ndings in our interviews. A respondent from Tennessee noted that the new policy was not always used by OPO employees and this may drive the limited impact in the years following the adoption. It thus appears that enforcement of this policy is critical for it to impact donation rates, but even then it is not a cure-all for increasing donations. To obtain a better estimate of the effects of fi rstperson consent, we moved beyond this impressionistic evidence to an empirical model of the cadaveric donation rate in a state.
Our model uses data on cadaveric donation rates from thirty-eight states from 1988 to 2002 (UNOS 2002) . The dependent variable is measured as the number of cadaveric donors per one thousand residents. We use the per capita measure to account for the fact that the actual number of donors in most states trends upward due simply to population growth. In the regression models, we multiply this fi gure by one thousand to improve the presentation of the results. Without this, many coeffi cients would have to be presented in scientifi c notation, and the scaling in no way changes the results. This data set allows us to look at those states for which we have a reasonably long time series of donation rates and which have imple- legally binding consent at different points in this time span. 1 We should note that state level data are not optimal for a test of these policies given that states occasionally have more than one OPO operating within their borders. This means a state may have one OPO enforcing the legally binding legislation and another that has chosen not to. The only means of dividing states in such a manner would involve the development of a county-level data set; however, cadaveric donor rates and other variables are not available at this level. We proceed on the assumption that if the policies are effective they should lift statewide totals as a result of boosting donations within the area covered by the participating OPO.
When estimating a pooled time-series cross-sectional model, it is important to consider the potential impact of time dependency and heterogeneity that may arise due to differences across states that are not accounted for in the model. Our data suggest that we face both problems. The dependent variable shows strong inertia over time, and this requires us to take into account the possibility of serial correlation in the data. We do so by including the fi rst lag of the dependent variable in the model. 2 This accounts for the trend and the history of infl uences in and out of the model. Hypothesis tests also indicated that state effects (or fi xed effects in the panel estimation literature) were present. We account for these by including thirty-seven separate state dummies. We thus estimate a least squares dummy variable model with a lagged dependent variable. 3 Table 1 presents the results of two regression models. The fi rst, designed to serve as a baseline for comparison, includes a series of control variables previously found to infl uence donation rates. The second includes two variables that test the effectiveness of the recent policy initiatives. One tests for the effect of adopting a donor registry and takes on a value of one in the year a state began the registry and every year thereafter. The second variable tests the effectiveness of enforcing legally binding con-1. The set of states is also driven by the need to have a balanced panel. A balanced panel has the same number of years for every state in the data set. We choose to maximize the number of years at the expense of a number of states with some data available to obtain a better comparison of donation rates before and after the policy change.
2. Lagged dependent variables can introduce bias when used in OLS regressions; however, the bias tends to be small and centered on the lagged coeffi cient. Moreover, the ability to avoid a large group of dummy variables to account for years' effects improves the effi ciency of the estimates (see Keele and Kelly 2004) .
3. Several specifi cations for the model were ruled out. First, a Hausman specifi cation test raised concerns about a correlation between the regressors and possible random effects, thus ruling out that alternative model. We chose not to estimate a standard fi xed-effects model due to the inclusion of several independent variables that change slowly over time (see Wilson and Butler 2004 for a discussion).
sent and enters the model as the number of years legally binding consent has been enforced. So in the fi rst year a state enforces legally binding consent it takes on a value of one, in the second two, and so forth. We chose this measure for several reasons. Our data indicate that states with lower donation rates are more likely to adopt the policy and in an analysis that included a dummy variable for just the fi rst year of enforcement, the policy had a negative effect. The negative effect, however, reversed as time went on. It thus appears that it takes time for the policy to be accepted and properly implemented, a fi nding in line with our interviews. The counter variable allows for the infl uence of the early years as well as for the ability of the policy to become more effective over time. Our sample includes eight states that began enforcing legally binding consent in 2001 or 2002 and this may bias the model against fi nding a positive infl uence, so we have what amounts to a very diffi cult test for effectiveness.
To properly test the effectiveness of the two policy tools, we must control for factors that infl uence the rate of donation. To accomplish this, we reviewed previous studies in the public health literature on the determinants of donation rates. Although the primary barrier to donation is the denial of family consent at the time of death, research has revealed numerous factors associated with denial of consent (Rocheleau 2001) .
Race has long been associated with donation rates, with the majority of donors being white (UNOS 2002). Early studies found that support for organ donation was lower among nonwhite than white Americans (Gallup Organization 1993). More recently, surveys have found that nonwhites support donation but are approached less often by health care professionals (Morgan 2004; Siminoff and Sturm 2000) . African Americans were also found to be less trusting of the medical profession and less aware of the need for organs, even within the African American community (Siminoff and Sturm 2000) . For these reasons, we include variables to account for the size of the nonwhite population in the states. The variables are measured as the total resident black and Hispanic population in thousands as reported in the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003).
Another common misconception about donation is that certain religions do not support it. Although specifi c views differ by denomination, UNOS contends that a majority of mainstream organized religions approve of both organ and tissue donation; however, to match the misperception as it may exist in the public, we include a variable measuring the percentage of the total population that are Christian adherents per state as reported in
Churches and Church Membership in the United States 1980 and 1990 (State Politics and Policy Quarterly Data Resource 2004).
The level of education that a community has attained may also be related to organ and tissue donation rates. A survey published in the Journal of Transplant Coordination in 1995 found that one of the factors that led to differences between whites and minorities in their beliefs about organ donation might be their level of education (Franz et al. 1995: 52) . The study states that educational differences manifest themselves in the level of exposure to information about organ donation. Another study found Caplan (2001) contends that poor people do not donate their organs at the same rate as the rich for the simple reason that many of them do not have health insurance and they often believe that the rich have a much better chance of getting transplants than the poor. Personal income is also a key variable to include in this analysis because it is an important constraint on state programs (Gray, Hanson, and Jacob 1999 (2003).
The segments of the population that live in the metropolitan areas with a higher population density may be positively related to higher levels of donation. This may be due to accessibility issues such as being in proximity to donor hospitals, health care professionals, and OPOs. This variable is measured as population per square mile, which is derived by dividing the number of people by the land area they occupy. Population density was calculated from data obtained in the Statistical Abstract of the United States (State Politics and Policy Quarterly Data Resource 2004).
Finally, among the top causes of death among cadaveric organ and tissue donors are motor vehicle accidents (MVAs). To tap the supply of organs in an area, we collected data on deaths resulting from MVAs, measured as motor vehicles traffi c fatalities by state.
Based on this research, we selected the following control variables: race (both black and Hispanic), income level, education level, religion, traffi c fatalities, and population density. Concerns over multicollinearity forced us to drop the variable measuring traffi c fatalities. The effect of this variable is tapped by state income and population density. One variable we are unable to control for is state spending on educational activities. A check of state budget records and discussions with offi cials led us to conclude that standardized time-series data would not be readily available. The basic model is presented in the following equation. Because the state dummy coeffi cients are not of great interest to us, we omit them here and in the regression results for sake of clear presentation.
Cadaveric Donation Rate = ␤ 0 + ␤ 1 Lagged Donation Rates + ␤ 2 % of Population Black + ␤ 3 % of Population Hispanic + ␤ 4 % of Population Christian Adherents + ␤ 5 Per Capita Personal Income + ␤ 6 Population Density + ␤ 7 % High School Diploma + ␤ 8 Number of Years Legally Binding Enforced + ␤ 9 State Donor Registry + ⑀
We focus fi rst on the policy changes. The coeffi cient on the number of years legally binding consent has been enforced is positive and signifi cant, indicating that enforcement of legally binding consent does, over time, increase the expected number of donors. The strength of the impact is, however, modest. Two things make this a more positive fi nding than the small coeffi cient may indicate. First, we need to recall that the fi rst years of enforcement are when the policy has little impact, and in our sample we have eight states that just began enforcement of the law. According to these results, the policy should pay more dividends as time goes on, and this suggests that a stronger impact may emerge as more data become available. We estimated the model using data for 1988-2001 and the impact was signifi cant and stronger. Second, these numbers are all more signifi cant when one considers that a single organ, tissue, and eye donor can help up to two hundred patients (Center for Organ Recovery and Education 2000). The donor registry variable is not signifi cant, a result we are unable to explain. Perhaps registries help in the identifi cation of potential donors, but the impact on donation rates is muted by the number of factors that go into actually retrieving the organs.
The models produce another important result. Although the legally binding variable is signifi cant, it only modestly improves the overall performance of the model. When we compare the full model to the baseline model that only contains the control variable, we see little improvement. Together the policy variables explain less than 1 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. It appears that, as a result of the complexity in implementing the legally binding consent policy and the concerns regarding purposeful noncompliance, this policy has had a real but modest impact. However, even this modest effect shows the potential of the wider adoption of legally binding consent, an issue we return to in the discussion below.
We also tested for the possibility that the adoption of legally binding consent by a state might have a more symbolic impact. A number of states have passed laws allowing for the use of legally binding consent only to have the OPOs not actually use the law. It is possible that the passage of such a law might increase the visibility of the problem and encourage donation. In models not reported here, we tested for this by including variables for the year of enactment (but no enforcement), for two years of enactment to allow for a lagged effect, and a dummy for all years a state had legally binding consent on the books but no OPO enforced it. None of these variables were signifi cant, indicating that enactment without enforcement has no effect, symbolic or otherwise.
Before turning to a broader discussion of the results, we should note several other fi ndings from our model. First, contrary to existing research, and our own expectations, a larger African American population did not decrease the availability of organs. To the contrary, states with higher percentages of African Americans had higher numbers of donors. Although this may capture the greater availability of donors in urban settings, it is a positive fi nding even if it only partially refl ects progress in minority acceptance of the practice. We are further encouraged by this fi nding because of the negative (albeit insignifi cant) infl uence we found for population density. This may indicate that the race variables are not simply tapping the infl uence of urban areas. The coeffi cient for the Hispanic population was negative, but did not quite reach standard levels of statistical signifi cance, suggesting more work needs to be done in this community.
One concern often expressed about using fi rst-person consent is the potential to scare off additional donors. A clear test of this concern would be to include our legally binding variable in a model of the number of registered donors in a state. Although we have data on the number of registered donors for twelve of the states using fi rst-person consent, a statistical test is diffi cult to implement because of the low number of states and the different periods covered by the data. With data quality in mind, we examined the trends in the number of registered donors in these states and estimated several models to get a sense of whether this concern was legitimate. The results were inconclusive. It is diffi cult to gauge the impact of fi rst-person consent because many of the states that now implement it do so because they had relatively low registration rates to begin with (thus a motivation for making the policy change). Our analysis found four states for which the number of registrations declined after initiating fi rst-person consent, two states for which fl uctuations ended with no net gain, and six states that showed an increase in registrations after several years. In the regression models not reported here, the coeffi cient on legally binding consent was negative but insignifi cant, whereas the coeffi cient on the donor registry variable was positive and insignifi cant. Overall, the potential negative infl uence of legally binding consent does not appear to have materialized, a fi nding supported by our interview data as well.
Discussion
Altruism is not enough to ensure a proper supply of organs and tissue for those in need. As we noted earlier, organ donation involves a unique form of agency; potential donors are reliant upon a number of actors to ensure that their wishes are carried out. Most often a declared donor's next of kin is required to make an altruistic act as well by consenting to donation a second time. Currently, the lack of family consent is the primary reason a potential donor's initial altruistic act is not carried out. Taking this initial act as legally binding consent increases the number of donors beyond what we would expect based on state characteristics. Our research indicates that policies designed to assist altruism can help close this gap. In this section, we look more closely at the implications of our fi ndings, the broader task of addressing agency failures in organ donation, and where additional research might be directed to better inform policy development.
The Promise of Legally Binding Consent
Our statistical analyses indicated that the presence of legally binding consent only explained a small portion of the donation rates in the states. Implementation of the policy thus appears to have a positive effect. But how strong of an effect is this and what kind of impact might a wider adoption of legally binding consent have? According to our analysis, each additional year of implementing legally binding consent adds 0.000544 donors per one thousand residents. On its face, this is a very small number. This means that a state such as Nevada with about 2 million residents could expect one additional donor for each year legally binding consent is implemented, and depending on the donor, that can translate into fi ve or more major organ transplants and numerous tissue transplants.
We can get a better sense of the impact of the policy by looking at the expected gain in donors for larger populations. California, the largest state with just over 35 million residents, could gain around nineteen additional donors per year. Nationally, the fi gure would be around 152 donors (assuming a population estimate of 281 million). This is not a trivial gain. To put this in perspective, we can compare this to the actual gains in cadaveric donation as reported by UNOS. Between 1988 and 2003, UNOS reports an average increase of 158 donors per year, with two years witnessing a decrease and six years witnessing below average gains. A national effort to implement legally binding consent could match current efforts to increase donors in its fi rst year. If the gains continue, this policy has the potential to produce several hundred additional donors and several thousand organs each year. This is a modest fraction of the current 87,000-person waiting list, but the impact in terms of the number of lives saved would be substantial.
Better Understanding Legally Binding Consent
It is important to note that the full impact of this change may yet need to be realized or estimated in our model. Our interview respondents often voiced concerns about or experiences with improper implementation of the policy. Wider acceptance, better training, and full implementation might very well improve the policy's ability to increase the number of donors. Importantly, use of the policy does not appear to have scared off potential donors when we looked at the impact on donor registration rates. Our evidence on these points is, however, limited. Our interview sample was small and focused primarily on individuals in leadership positions within OPOs and hospitals, and our donor registration data were insuffi cient for statistical analyses. Our fi ndings and these gaps in our knowledge point to a number of directions for future research that would give us a more thorough understanding of the effectiveness of legally binding consent, the implementation problems depicted, and its consequences on other donation strategies.
Two issues related to the effectiveness of the policies warrant further research: the over-time gains from the policy as currently implemented and the implementation problems identifi ed in our interviews. Our results indicate that neither the symbolic adoption nor the mere presence of legally binding consent will improve donation rates. The statistically signifi cant results were found for the number of years implemented, with the implication being that states could add additional donors with each year of implementation. The duration of these gains remains an open question. These dynamics merit further attention as additional data become available. If the gains continue for a long time, we have likely underestimated the impact of the policy. However, if the gains level off relatively quickly, the increase in donors may stagnate and thus only slightly reduce the gap between organs needed and donated. A closer look at the over-time histories of states adopting the policies could provide insight into this issue. The ability to do this is limited only by the low number of states having implemented legally binding consent for a lengthy period of time.
Perhaps the most important question regarding the effectiveness of legally binding consent is how states can better implement the policy to increase the gains identifi ed in this study. As noted earlier, interview respondents mentioned a lack of commitment to the policy and a resistance on the part of some to use it. Understanding the extent to which such views are held among the larger population of OPO and hospital workers and the reasons behind them would be of great value. A multimethod approach would best address this question, but would require some resources. A survey of relevant actors regarding their views on the use of legally binding consent, their experiences, and their training would provide the best picture of implementation practices. This could be supplemented with a more structured set of interviews with OPO directors regarding the environment the OPO has sought to create and how OPOs have or have not fostered the use of legally binding consent. Finally, a review could be conducted of the training and policy efforts undertaken by those OPOs that have adopted legally binding consent. This could take the form of a best practices review and provide insight into how to best improve implementation. The result of such a study could answer the question why the impact of the policy appears to be relatively low and could offer important lessons for improving the use of legally binding consent.
Research also needs to be directed at the potential broader consequences of the adoption of legally binding consent. Opponents of the policy have expressed concerns that the use of legally binding consent may result in fewer potential donors because it has the potential to anger the deceased's next of kin who may then choose not to become donors themselves, and it may cause people to not register as donors out of the fear that their families will be bypassed and their interests be less protected should they become a candidate for donation. A fair amount of research has been conducted to examine individual decisions to register and family decisions to consent to donation, but there exists no direct effort to study the impact of legally binding consent on these decisions.
Interviews with the families of donors would be an invaluable tool to study the impact of legally binding consent; however, it would be best to assess the impact of the policy close to the time of donation and access to these subjects would be diffi cult. Survey research is perhaps the best tool to address the impact of the policy on the broader pool of potential donors. Studies of registered donors or the broader public could include questions regarding their views of legally binding consent and how they might infl uence their decisions. But scholars should not be wedded to this technique.
Earlier we reviewed Evans's (2003) experimental study investigating the impact of fi nancial incentives on donation. In addition to providing insight into the viability of such policies, this piece provides a methodological template for studying the impact of legally binding consent. Evans presented participants with a number of vignettes that included variations in the circumstances of the donation and the nature of the fi nancial incentives involved and then asked respondents about their willingness to consent to donation. A similar approach could be taken to study the impact of various forms of consent. Participants could be asked about either their willingness to register as donors or their willingness to consent to the harvesting of a loved one's organs. The experimental treatments could vary the circumstances under which organs could be or were harvested and posttreatment questions could assess the impact on attitudes regarding donation. Any of these studies would enhance the understanding of how the widespread adoption of legally binding consent, or even policies of implied consent, would affect individual attitudes and thus the larger pool of potential donors.
Agency and the Development of Organ Donation Policy
Successfully fi lling the demand for organs and tissue will require more than the use of legally binding consent. As noted above, the policy could yield thousands of additional organs, but this would still fall well short of the numbers needed. It is therefore worthwhile to take this discussion a step beyond the use of legally binding consent to address the broader policy failures in this area. Policies designed to recruit prospective donors are meant to get individuals to enter into a complex principal-agent relationship in which another actor will be necessary to implement their desired outcome. These policies include public education campaigns, making registration easy via drivers' license renewal, and requiring that hospital workers inquire about a patient's intent. Policies directed at organ recovery have been driven by the need to overcome the problem that the principal is unable to monitor or enforce his or her desired outcome, a situation that is endemic in health care policy (Tuohy 2003) . Family members have traditionally acted as agents for prospective donors, and the slippage between the prospective donor's intent and the agent's action has often resulted from the presence of either uncertainty or incomplete information.
Many policies are designed to ensure that the family, as agent, is knowledgeable of the donor's intent and willing to consent at a diffi cult time. These policies focus on encouraging potential donors to communicate their desires with family members or to include them in advance direc-tives. The diffi culty in obtaining family consent led policy makers to actually seek to replace the family with a less emotionally attached agent, namely OPO and hospital staff. When the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act established legally binding consent, the intent was to protect the donor's intent by shifting implementation responsibility to nonfamily actors.
Some policies are designed to go further still. Living donors are able to escape this problem by fully monitoring their decision to donate an organ. Implied consent of cadaveric donation in which all individuals are presumed donors and required response laws that assume a person is a donor unless they specifi cally state otherwise seek to remove the agency issue all together. Calls for implied consent have increased as the waiting list for organs has grown. The demand for organs is likely to increase as society ages, lives longer, and has increasing access to medical technologies that can extend life. Such a policy would have to overcome the strong ethical emphasis placed on patient autonomy in Western health care. As Elizabeth Bradley and John Rizzo (1999) note, patient autonomy has long been an established right in both research and therapeutic treatment. They further note that by the 1970s this right had been generalized to include rights to informed consent, to the refusal of treatment, and to participate in medical decisions. Overcoming this principle seems unlikely given the importance of individualism and libertarianism in American attitudes (McClosky and Zaller 1984) . Rarely are ingrained public attitudes overcome without recurring problems or events that focus attention on a societal need. Attitudes regarding race are a clear example. Early court decisions required the civil rights movement and continued oppression before resulting in a shift in attitudes and policy. Americans would need to be convinced that organ donation is relevant to them personally, a signifi cant hurdle given people's diffi culty in estimating the likelihood that they may need a transplant at some point (Bradley and Rizzo 1999) .
The inherent diffi culties in moving to implied consent means that we should continue to direct our efforts to developing policies designed to address agency failures. Agency failure is common in health care and other regulated fi elds, and we can thus look past the existing efforts within organ donation policies to fi nd possible solutions to these problems.
One means of preventing agents from engaging in actions counter to the principle is to increase monitoring or oversight of their activities. A lack of oversight can result in increased uncertainty and greater independence on the part of the agent. One such relationship under heavy scrutiny is the role played by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) accrediting hospitals for Medicare-funded ser- (Tieman 2004) . Several studies have raised questions about the effectiveness of JCAHO's activities after fi nding no relationship between scores assigned by JCAHO and measures of health care outcomes and the fact that JCAHO often missed violations identifi ed by state safety inspectors (Griffi th, Knutzen, and Alexander 2002; GAO 2004) .
The criticisms of JCAHO focus on the organization's close relationship to the health industry it is supposed to regulate and the inability of CMS to take direct action to ensure satisfactory performance (Griffi th, Knutzen, and Alexander 2002; GAO 2004; Sloane 2004) . Recommendations to improve JCAHO's performance have included increasing its independence by reducing fi nancial and managerial ties to health care providers, focusing more on examining outcome-based measures of hospital performance, and giving CMS greater authority over the accreditation program (Griffi th, Knutzen, and Alexander 2002; GAO 2004; Sloane 2004; Tieman 2004 ). An increase in monitoring and auditing may be one route to encourage better practices in organ recovery. OPOs and hospitals effectively act as agents for the federal government in implementing the nation's organ donation policy. As a result, improving their performance may be a means of ensuring fewer breakdowns when opportunities for donation arise. JCAHO (2004) itself has issued a call for increased federal involvement in and oversight of organ donation. As part of a broad set of policy recommendations, JCAHO has called for CMS to increase funding for Medicare facilities that keep viable donors alive, for CMS to make organ donation rates an outcome measure that helps determine pay rates for hospitals, and for CMS to develop and implement requirements of periodic assessment of donation rates and practices (ibid.). Such changes may be one of the few nonvoluntary policy options available. Financial sanctions, effectively taking on the form of a private sector contract, are one of the best means for preventing agency problems, but they have rarely been applied in this area. Inserting organ donation into pay for performance models of funding is one means to do this. JCAHO's (ibid.) recommendations may also be a means of ensuring more regular auditing of best practices that can then be used to foster better performance across the health care system.
A second area identifi ed for improvement is the communication between OPO coordinators and both patients and family members. The studies reviewed earlier suggest that using coordinators or volunteers who have experienced organ donation or who share the race or background of donors may be very valuable (Henderson 2000; Siminoff and Sturm 2000) . Similar results have been found in studies of the implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act that seek to promote the use of advance directives for end-of-life care. These studies found an increase in advance directive use immediately following the passage of the act, but subsequent analyses over time have found that these gains have not been sustainable (Bradley and Rizzo 1999; Baker et al. 2003) . Researchers have found that although almost all patients are asked about the existence of an advance directive, far fewer are presented with additional information about them (Silverman et al. 1995) . Henry Silverman et al. (ibid.) suggested better training to enhance the quality of the interaction with patients and effort to better account for the social diversity of patients.
Given the importance of the communication with patients and next of kin, an expansion of the pilot programs using volunteers who have consented to donations appears warranted, as does the use of what JCAHO (2004) refers to as "ethnically like requestors." JCAHO (ibid.) also advocated placing transplant coordinators in more Level I trauma centers where the majority of organs are recovered. Given the success of the similar effort in Spain noted earlier, this suggestion deserves study. In-house coordinators can provide a number of benefi ts to overcome agency issues. First, they can monitor emergency rooms and thus more quickly initiate contact and assess whether special circumstances may warrant bringing in other counselors. Second, in-house monitors will reduce the number of steps necessary to initiate contact, thus reducing the number of points where contact can be lost. Finally, these coordinators can be trained and monitored in an ongoing fashion and rewarded appropriately. This can improve communication and promote accountability (Tuohy 2003; JCAHO 2004) .
Policy makers may also want to look beyond principal-agent theory to address organ donation. Lisa Dicke (2002) has suggested that when principals and agents share core beliefs, policy makers may want to look beyond the control-based policies suggested by principal-agent theory to stewardship theory as an alternative. Stewardship theory argues that a shared commitment to core public service values can promote an internal sense of responsibility that in turn produces accountable behavior. In a study of human services contracting, Dicke (ibid.) found that resources often limited external control mechanisms such as monitoring and oversight, but that internal control could be fostered using professional and ethical values and investments in staff training and development.
Such a strategy appears to have guided JCAHO's (2004) call for the 714 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law development of a culture within health care that makes organ donation a priority. JCAHO (ibid.) calls for a major commitment to recruiting highly motivated and skilled staff for OPOs and efforts to integrate organ donation into all the roles and routines in hospitals. The JCAHO recommendations seek to promote internal accountability by making the roles of transplant offi cials more specialized, integrating OPO staff into hospital structures, setting high standards for donation practices, and holding staff accountable for achieving the standards by rewarding them accordingly. Improving donation rates requires that we fi rst register more donors and that we ensure that problems inherent in agency relationships do not derail that intent. Public education efforts are a valuable means to recruit donors and educate them on the importance of communicating their intent to their family. In fact, better and recurring communication with previously registered donors may be useful. Also important is the better implementation of implied consent laws. We found this policy to be effective and to warrant further study to ensure no negative effects on registration rates. Finally, policy makers need to take the lessons of stewardship theory seriously. The JCAHO (ibid.) recommendations are a fi rst step toward creating a better network of transplant coordinators who are also better trained and more committed to higher expectations. Further steps to promote internal accountability should be explored. Policy makers and OPOs should consider professional licensing programs and peer reviews as methods of fostering internal commitment and performance (Dicke 2002) . The ideas discussed in the preceding paragraphs can address agency failures in this area by lessening our reliance on this form of relationship and control. The increasing need for organs suggests that such thinking is warranted.
